the same as traditional historical research. He draws on statistical data and qualitative source material (oral history and interviews, newspapers, local histories, government documents, and memoirs) to show the ways in which Midwesterners altered farming techniques, reorganized business ventures and community life, and emphasized high quality public education. Edge cities became increasingly important in the region, because the office parks, corporate headquarters, and research labs located there helped retain midwestern university graduates and attracted outsiders. Readers will appreciate that the post-1950s period does not exist in a vacuum. In each chapter and to great effect, Wuthnow examines nineteenth- and early twentieth-century antecedents to explain the postwar period. One notable example of this is the way the author demonstrates how the rise of agribusiness after World War II did not represent a disjunction with prewar conditions. Stories of the decentralization of the meatpacking industry from cities to rural areas of low wages and easy access to transportation need greater context, Wuthnow shows. Farm families of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fought monopoly power through cooperation, both informal and formal, and actively sought greater control over price through ever greater market connections, efforts that prepared the way for major agriculture businesses. Towns such as Garden City, Kansas exemplified this trend by welcoming and accommodating significant economic and demographic change.

The author is not always completely persuasive, however. The chapter on remaking midwestern identity is the least satisfactory of the book’s seven chapters. Wuthnow claims that Middle Westerners retained a local and regional identity “by shaping the meaning of the various traditions at their disposal,” simultaneously de-emphasizing the region’s Wild West past and stressing the stories of creative and dogged pioneers such as the Ingalls family, made famous by Laura Ingalls Wilder (p. 59). But changing perceptions about the Wild West as an increasingly mythical and remote place, both temporally and spatially, seem much more of an American phenomenon than a specifically midwestern one. Wuthnow’s definition of the heartland is provoking. On the surface, the selection of the nine states as the heartland makes sense. These states occupy the great middle swath of the nation from Canada to the northern boundaries of Texas and Louisiana where there are few metropolitan centers and agriculture remains among the most significant economic activities. Yet Arkansas is undeniably southern and is an outlier in regard to educational attainment and other evidence the author presents. Excluding Illinois and Indiana, not to mention Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan, is odd, given the many similarities with Wuthnow’s heartland states and their traditional midwestern association. Finally, the book would benefit from greater attention to the ways in which the ecosystems of the rural Midwest have been shaped by significant economic transformations. Irrigation is an important topic in the book, but there is little note of changes in water quality and availability, such as groundwater contamination related to livestock and crop production or the impact of irrigation on the Ogallala Aquifer. Despite these comparatively minor complaints, the book under review is a well-written, detailed, and persuasive account of change in the region.

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The last two decades have seen a rise in book-length historical studies of affirmative action. David Hamilton Golland’s work is a welcome addition to the literature and debates on this contentious issue. Focusing on Philadelphia, the title puns the particular focus he has taken on this key aspect of affirmative action, namely the struggle for equal employment opportunity for African Americans who for years were excluded from the construction industry and its trade unions.

Golland reminds us that “affirmative action” has been not just a public policy filled with ironies, interest convergences, and unintended consequences but also a struggle that at its heart challenges the privileges of white supremacy. The book’s dust jacket features a 1963 photograph of black men and women picketing a construction site in Philadelphia, led by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other civil rights groups. One picket sign reads: “Phila.’s Labor Bigots Must Go Also.” Indeed, the NAACP and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) locked horns over segregated trade unions both North and South in the 1960s. George Shultz, Secretary of Labor and Commerce under President Richard Nixon, once wryly commented that before the Philadelphia Plan the quota for blacks in the construction industry was zero.

Golland has successfully mined primary sources from government, labor, and civil rights organizations to debunk notions of Nixon as an affirmative action pioneer or civil rights president. He seeks instead to help restore to the historical narrative the important role played by popular forces campaigning for civil rights as sparks to this public policy, which he further notes was kept alive by certain government bureaucrats through the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Chapters one and two chart the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations’ reluctant response to civil rights movement pressure. Chapter three highlights federal officials’ testing employment integration plans between the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1967 introduction of the Philadelphia and Cleveland Plans. Chapters four and five use Philadelphia as a point of departure to view local and national battles over affirmative action in construction from 1967 to 1973.

“This book,” writes Golland, “treats the two itera-
tions of the Philadelphia Plan as the collective watershed moment in the origin of affirmative action” (p. 3). Tracing the history of that plan, Golland effectively contrasts it with progress or obstruction in other cities. Despite opponents’ claims that this was a quota system, Golland points out that it was not, noting that civil rights leaders themselves were “leery of quotas” (p. 128). The plan did, however, require the construction industry and unions to set goals and timetables for training and hiring African Americans. Golland highlights the work of affirmative action advocates like NAACP Labor Secretary Herbert Hill and Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur Fletcher, contrasted with Nixon’s cynical usage of affirmative action to try to split the Democratic Party’s labor and civil rights constituencies. That overt attempt was perhaps best exemplified with his appointment of trade union leader and affirmative action opponent Peter Brennan as secretary of labor.

Golland makes no apology for his affirmative action advocacy. This is not problematic in itself. But he encounters analytical gridlock by narrowly framing affirmative action as simply “positive steps” (p. 173) for “equal opportunity,” with “preferences and quotas” being departures from what was “originally intended” (p. 5). Who intended this? What if “positive steps” alone turned out to be an insufficient remedy to combat discrimination? How do we undo historical white preferences in construction or anywhere else without introducing correctives that include some kind of black “hiring preferences,” as Nancy MacLean put it in her discussion of the Philadelphia Plan (p. 173)? Golland also misreads “diversity” as a diversion from affirmative action public policy (p. 172), whereas Kimberle Crenshaw and others have noted that “diversity” became an affirmative action strategy after the 1978 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke decision banned minority admissions preferences and quotas in higher education.

The book is clearly argued and accessibly written—no easy task when trying to describe details of the construction trades, popular movements, labor organizations, and civil rights law. It is less successful in its broader view of the affirmative action struggle. In addition, some antiquated conceptualizations periodically pop up (e.g., “white backlash,” pp. 119, 150). There is also the occasional odd generalization such as: “At the start of 1961, civil rights leaders could look back at two decades of progress in voting rights and public accommodation” (p. 33), suggesting a need for better editing. Nonetheless, this is both a good scholarly and general read, not to mention teaching tool. Few historians have focused so much research on the construction industry and trade unions as one of the key sites of the modern affirmative action battle. With the U.S. Supreme Court possibly poised to overturn affirmative action, we need to see what we may lose with its dismantling.

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Larry Grubbs’s book is a thoughtful account of the creation, implementation, and shortcomings of U.S. aid policy in Africa during the 1960s. Based on archival material, published primary sources, and a wide range of secondary works, this history utilizes the examples of Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Congo to show that American aid policy toward Africa was flawed from the beginning and therefore had no chance for success. The book delves into cultural ideas ingrained in “secular missionaries” who executed development policies in Africa.

Shortly after his inauguration, President John F. Kennedy acted on his campaign promise to assist the development of African nations in order to ensure that they looked to the United States rather than to the Soviet Union for “leadership.” To that end, he created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps, and assigned them to promote development and modernization in Africa. While USAID focused on grants and technical aid, Peace Corps volunteers provided a variety of educational and community development services. Fittingly, Kennedy termed the 1960s the “Decade of Development” and brought into his administration leading experts on modernization theory and African affairs.

USAID’s performance was stymied from the beginning by its cumbersome procedures, burdensome congressional oversight, and budget cuts. African governments were to abide by guidelines that were generally unclear as Ambassador William Attwood of Guinea noted: “You couldn’t blame the Guineans for being confused in our procedures; we had trouble understanding some of them ourselves” (p. 133). USAID delayed aid to Somalia, Senegal, and other nations on the grounds that their development plans were poorly designed and did not include enough “self-help” projects, prompting Somalia’s prime minister to complain that American aid “procedures are too slow, conditions too restrictive” (p. 132). In addition officials in Washington often failed to consult with leaders of African nations. Uncertain of the procedures, nations turned to American experts for help. Nigeria’s development plan, for example, was written by an American economist, Wolfgang Stolper, who had limited knowledge of Nigeria’s history. Little was achieved. Considered by the agency to be an emerging leader in Africa, Nigeria experienced a coup in 1966 and the following year was thrown into a civil war. In the Sudan USAID did a feasibility study of a road from Khartoum to Port Sudan, but the project was only completed in the 1990s by a company known as the Bin Laden Group. The Congo crisis exposed the tragedy of U.S. policy in Africa. The nation eventually fell under the control of Mobutu Sésé Seko, one of Africa’s worst despots and a key U.S. ally in the region. And so went the story of USAID’s involvement in Af-